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Abstract 
 The Common Core State Standards (CCSS), released in 2010, represented a new 
push to standardize curriculum across states and to promote college and career readiness 
in schools. The federal government’s Race to the Top grant program indirectly created 
strong incentives for states to adopt the CCSS, and 45 states and the District of Columbia 
adopted the standards. Since their adoption, many states have shown signs of moving 
away from the CCSS through bills introduced in state legislatures and Indiana has 
recently become the first state to officially opt out of the Standards. This paper seeks to 
examine this movement away from the CCSS and to answer the following research 
question: what are the factors that are leading states to show signs of backing away from 
these standards that they have adopted? This paper addresses internal and external factors 
that could lead to this outcome, including states’ motivation to move away from the 
CCSS and the legislative obstacles that states may face in this process. 
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Introduction 
 On March 24, 2014, Indiana became the first state to officially pass legislation to 
opt out of the Common Core State Standards.1 Indiana, which was among the first few of 
the 45 states to adopt the Common Core, could serve as a model for other states moving 
in this anti-Common Core direction. State legislatures have become increasingly involved 
in the debate about the Common Core, as legislation related to the Standards has been 
increasingly more prevalent over the few years since the Standards were introduced and 
adopted. In this paper, I will analyze introductions of bills related to the Common Core 
State Standards that were introduced in state legislatures in the period from January 2011 
to December 2013 in an attempt to answer the question: how can we explain the states’ 
movement away from the Common Core State Standards? 
The Rise of Standards-Based Learning and the Common Core State Standards 
The Common Core State Standards (CCSS) Initiative, announced in 2009 and 
released in June 2010 for math and English and sponsored by the National Governors 
Association, the Council of Chief State School Officers, and the non-profit group 
Achieve, represented a new push to standardize the expectations of what students should 
know at each grade level across states to better prepare students for college and to enter 
the workforce. Shortly following their release in 2010, CCSS was adopted by 39 states 
and the District of Columbia. In subsequent years, six more states have adopted the 
Standards, resulting in the presence of CCSS in schools in 45 states plus the District of 
Columbia. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!http://www.indystar.com/story/news/education/2014/03/24/gov-mike-pence-ends-
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Efforts to create uniform national standards in the past have not garnered much 
support. Party politics have been one factor contributing to pushback against national 
standards: fears of federal takeover of a historically state-held responsibility dominate 
from the right, while disagreement about assessments extends from the left. Additionally, 
lawmakers and education experts have experienced much difficulty reaching agreement 
as to what students should be learning. In 1990, George H.W. Bush set up the National 
Education Goals Panel to work towards drafting national standards. History standards in 
particular caused much disagreement. In fact, when these proposed history standards 
went before the U.S. Senate for a vote, they were voted down 99-1. 
The reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) as 
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) in 2001 provided a different avenue for strengthening 
content standards. Under this law, states were free to determine their own standards, but 
were required to reach certain levels of student proficiency. Since the introduction of 
NCLB, states had each set their own standards and administered their own assessments to 
determine the proficiency of their students. Under this system of state control over 
standards, children in different states could get very different levels of education. A key 
concern that arose in the years following the implementation of NCLB was that states 
creating their own standards might set the bar too low. States could shift their focus from 
improving learning to just increasing test scores. The Common Core State Standards 
arose from a desire to level the playing field across the country and to positively impact 
student achievement.  
According to Robert Rothman (2011), the Common Core State Standards differ 
from pre-existing state standards in four key ways. First, the CCSS are aimed at college 
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and career readiness. Second, the CCSS are internationally benchmarked. The CCSS are 
intended to be comparable to the expectations of nations that outperform the United 
States on measures of student achievement. Third, the CCSS are designed to clearly 
indicate to students, parents, and teachers what is most important to learn at each grade 
level. Fourth, the CCSS are intended to be common across all states. 
While previous efforts to move toward national standards have failed due to 
political roadblocks, the CCSS began with statements of support from chief state school 
officers and governors from 48 states and was supported by the federal government since 
before the Standards were even released.2  
Unlike previous attempts to create national standards, which were largely 
developed as top-down policy from the federal government, the CCSS were developed 
from bottom-up and then supported from top-down. The bottom-up development of the 
CCSS helped to alleviate the fears of federal overinvolvement in determining what 
children should learn, which was much of the issue with standardization efforts in the late 
1980s. 
One large indirect form of support for CCSS from the national government came 
through the Race to the Top (RTTT) program. One of the things that the U.S. Department 
of Education required applying states to do was to strengthen their standards and 
assessments. In the competition, 40 out of a possible 500 points given to each application 
were dependent upon whether the state had adopted common standards by August 2, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!In a 2009 speech to state governors, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan 
acknowledged his support of the initiative: “Kids competing for the same jobs should 
meet the same standards. So while this effort is being led at the state level, as it should 
be, it is absolutely a national challenge, which we must meet together or we will 
compromise our future.” (http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/06/06142009.html) !
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2010. These common standards were to be internationally benchmarked and to include 
components for college and career readiness. Although no direct reference to the CCSS 
was made, it was clear that states adopting CCSS would fill all of these criteria. Thus, 
without explicitly requiring states to adopt CCSS, the Department of Education created 
strong incentives for states to do so.  
At this point in time, since RTTT winners have been decided, that particular 
incentive for adoption of the CCSS has largely disappeared for most states. In the time 
that has passed since their adoption, several states have started to show signs of making a 
move away from the CCSS. Since the adoption of the CCSS by 45 states and the District 
of Columbia, bills representing a movement away from the CCSS have been introduced 
in many state legislatures across the country. While the majority of the bills introduced 
thus far have not been successful as far as revocation of the CCSS, with only Indiana so 
far being successful in signing one of these bills into law, the introduction of such bills 
illustrates the fact that moving away from the CCSS is an idea on the political agenda of 
legislators in multiple states. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
I believe there are two major factors that have a hand in influencing a state’s 
decision to either move away from the CCSS or to take no negative action: the political 
obstacles to innovation and the state’s motivation to keep up with other, more innovative, 
states.  The more political obstacles a legislator will face in making moves on legislation 
related to CCSS, the less likely it is that legislation will pass or even be introduced in the 
state legislative bodies. Legislators will, however, be likely to introduce legislation if 
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they are attempting to replicate things that have been done in other states that are 
considered more innovative. In other words, policies should diffuse from more innovative 
to less innovative states unless there are major political roadblocks holding back the 
process of diffusion. The existing literature on policy diffusion and innovation can be 
used as a framework to move toward an explanation for state movements away from the 
CCSS and to examine the likelihood that states will continue to move toward revocation 
of the standards in the future.  
Policy innovation occurs when a government adopts a policy that is considered 
“new” to that particular government (Walker 1969). Under this definition, innovation can 
occur even if many other governments have previously adopted the policy in question. 
Two major explanations exist for state government innovation: internal determinants and 
diffusion models. Internal determinants such as economic or demographic characteristics 
of a state can lead to innovation. Under diffusion models, innovation comes about in 
response to previous adoptions of policies by other states. Prior to Berry and Berry’s 
(1990) study of state lottery adoptions, internal determinants and diffusion effects were 
generally studied separately. This separation of the processes was empirically flawed. 
Very few policy adoptions can fully be explained as a function of solely internal 
determinants or diffusion effects. 
 The states, then, can be viewed as a social system where the adoption of a policy 
in one state is influenced by the behavior of other states. According to Berry and Berry 
(1997, 2007), there are three basic reasons why policies diffuse from state to state: 
learning, competition, and coercive pressure from the federal government. Walker (1969) 
asserted that state policymakers will use shortcuts in their decision-making by adopting 
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policies that have been proven successful in other states. This constitutes a state’s 
“learning” from others. Alternatively, states may emulate policies of other states in order 
to gain some advantage or to avoid falling behind. This competition between states can 
lead to a pattern of diffusion where states are looking to “leader states” to inform their 
policymaking. The third argument, supported by Walker (1969), is that although states 
are given their own authority, pressure still exists from the national or regional level to 
conform to certain standards, which can lead states to adopt certain policies or programs. 
 In the case of diffusion across the states, there are two ways to approach an 
explanation of patterns of adoption. First, a national interaction model assumes that the 
probability that a state will adopt a program is proportional to the number of interactions 
its officials have had with officials of already-adopting states (Gray 1973). The national 
interaction model is, however, limited in its effectiveness in explaining diffusion. The 
model assumes that at any given time, each non-adopter is equally likely to adopt the 
policy in question and that the only variable influencing this probability is the number of 
previous adopters. This approach then is not adequate for a more nuanced explanation of 
diffusion because factors internal to each state will also play a significant role in whether 
or not a state adopts a policy. The second way to approach an explanation of patterns of 
adoptions is a regional diffusion model. The regional model assumes that states will be 
influenced most by those states that are closest. This can be examined either by looking at 
states that share borders (Berry and Berry 1990) or by looking at states within fixed 
regions of the country (Mooney and Lee 1995).  
 Several other diffusion models can be used to examine diffusion across states. 
Leader-laggard models assume that certain states are pioneers in the adoption of a policy, 
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and that other states emulate these leaders (Walker 1969). Leader-laggard models assume 
that innovation comes from learning from those states that are seen as leaders. Collier and 
Messick (1975) developed a further explanation of leader-laggard models by 
hypothesizing that diffusion is the product of a hierarchical model. Once a specific 
characteristic – some measure of innovativeness – is defined and states are ranked on the 
value of this characteristic, it is believed that policies will diffuse down the hierarchy 
from most to least innovative. Isomorphism models posit that states are most likely to 
adopt policies from other states that are similar. This is particularly relevant in regional 
models of diffusion, where nearby states are more likely to be similar. Important 
similarities for diffusion include ideological similarity (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and 
Peterson 2004) and a wide range of “political, demographic and budgetary similarities” 
(Volden 2006). Vertical influence models are related to pressure from the national 
government to adopt certain policies, especially when the national government provides 
incentives for this policy adoption. 
 Certain explanations for policy diffusion also exist in the form of internal 
determinants models. These models explain diffusion as occurring due to reasons related 
to political, economic, and social characteristics of the state itself. Although it is highly 
unlikely that any policy adoption in a state is entirely independent from previous 
adoptions by other states, internal determinants models can be helpful in explaining the 
characteristics that determine if and when adoption will occur in a particular state once 
the state is aware of the policy due to previous adopters. Many theories from internal 
determinants models in state innovation come from theories about innovativeness in 
organizations. Mohr (1969) proposes that the probability that an organization will 
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innovate is inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation and is directly 
related to both the motivation to innovate and the availability of resources for 
overcoming the obstacles to innovation. One potential explanation for high motivation to 
innovate could be the severity of the problem at hand. The more severe the problem, the 
more likely a state will be to innovate by adopting policies to fix the problem due to a 
demand for innovation. The presence or absence of obstacles to innovation is also 
incredibly important in determining whether or not a state will innovate. Lack of 
available funding to support a new policy is one obvious issue that could potentially 
hinder movement toward innovation. According to Brooks (2005), fragmentation of 
political parties within the state could also lead to a decreased likelihood of innovation. If 
laws cannot be passed to support policies, innovation cannot occur.  
 An alternative explanation of propensity to innovate is the existence of policy 
windows, or rare periods of opportunity for innovation, that occur when a new politician 
takes office or a specific event occurs to make policy innovation more likely (Kingdon 
1984). This concept of a policy window could potentially be extended to explain effects 
of RTTT on states’ initial adoptions of the CCSS. 
A combination of internal determinants and diffusion is used to explain the 
probability that a state will adopt a policy in a specified time period in the unified model 
of state government innovation proposed by Berry and Berry (1997, 2007). The unified 
model of state government innovation seeks to explain the dependent variable – 
probability of adoption – through a collection of independent variables, including 
motivation to adopt the policy in question, the obstacles to innovation and the resources 
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available for overcoming those obstacles, diffusion effects of the state at the specified 
time period, and the presence or absence of other related policies. 
 
Common Core in State Legislatures: Defining the Landscape 
 Figure 1 shows both the total number of CCSS-related pieces of legislation 
broken down into the numbers of CCSS-negative and CCSS-positive pieces of legislation 
that have been introduced in each year over the time covered by my study. The total 
numbers of CCSS-related legislation, both positive and negative, have seen dramatic 
increases year after year, which shows legislators’ increased attention to the topic over 
time.  
Figure'1:'Total'Number'of'CCSS5Related'Bills'Introduced'in'Each'Year'(20115
2013)
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 Figure 2 gives a breakdown of total number of pieces of CCSS-related legislation 
introduced in each state legislature. From this figure, it is clear that there has been much 
variation across states as to how much attention this topic has been given in state 
legislatures. 
Figure'2:'Number'of'CCSS5Related'Bills'Introduced'in'Each'State'(201152013)'
!
 Figure 3 and Figure 4 give an overview of bill introductions in states based on 
the parties of the cosponsors of the bills. For each bill introduced, I collected information 
on all of the bill cosponsors. These cosponsors were then coded by party and averaged 
across bill introductions for each state. Republican cosponsors were coded as 1 and 
Democratic cosponsors were coded as -1. This number for each cosponsor for each bill in 
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each state was then averaged to produce a number between -1 and 1 for each state that 
shows which party in each state legislature had more CCSS-related bill cosponsorships. 
Figure 3 shows the party breakdown by state for all CCSS-related bill introductions. This 
figure shows that overall, CCSS-related legislation was introduced with relatively similar 
frequency across party lines.  
Figure'3:'Average'Party'Score'of'Bill'Introductions'in'Each'State'(201152013)'
!
 Figure 4 shows the same information, but only for CCSS-negative bills. This 
figure shows that legislators introducing CCSS-negative legislation across the states were 
overwhelmingly Republican. Of all the states with introductions of CCSS-negative 
legislation across the time period of my study (2011-2013), only three states saw 
! 15!
introductions of CCSS-negative legislation coming from mostly Democratic legislators. 
In 13 of these states, every CCSS-negative bill that was introduced was sponsored 
entirely by Republican legislators. 
Figure'4:'Average'Party'Score'of'Negative'Bill'Introductions'in'Each'State'
(201152013)'
!!
 When looking at the overall likelihood of the first introduction of such legislation 
in each state, it is clear that the probability of first introduction has been increasing over 
time. Tables 1-3 show the hazard rates for each month across the timespan covered by 
my dataset. Hazard rates for each time period were calculated by dividing the number of 
events occurring in each time period by the size of the risk set in that period.  
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Table 1: Monthly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Related 
Legislation 
Time Period 
States Introducing 
CCSS-Related 
Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
January 2011 CA, HI, MN, NH, OR, SD, WA 7 7 50 0.140 
February 2011 AR, NV, OK, SC 4 11 43 0.093 
March 2011 GA, ME, NC 3 14 39 0.077 
April 2011  0 14 36 0.000 
May 2011 AL 1 15 36 0.028 
June 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
July 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
August 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
September 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
October 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
November 2011  0 15 35 0.000 
December 2011 UT 1 16 35 0.029 
January 2012 
AZ, CO, DE, FL, IN, 
KY, MD, NM, TN, 
VT, WV, WY 
12 28 34 0.353 
February 2012 AK, CT, IA, MS, MO 5 33 22 0.227 
March 2012 LA, NJ, OH 3 36 17 0.176 
April 2012 PA 1 37 14 0.071 
May 2012 MT 1 38 13 0.077 
June 2012  0 38 12 0.000 
July 2012 MA 1 39 12 0.083 
August 2012  0 39 11 0.000 
September 2012 MI 1 40 11 0.091 
October 2012  0 40 10 0.000 
November 2012 IL 1 41 10 0.100 
December 2012  0 41 9 0.000 
January 2013 KS, NE, NY, ND, TX, VA 6 47 9 0.667 
February 2013  0 47 3 0.000 
March 2013 ID 1 48 3 0.333 
April 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
May 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
June 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
July 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
August 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
September 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
October 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
November 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
December 2013  0 48 2 0.000 
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Table 2: Monthly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Negative 
Legislation 
Time Period 
States Introducing 
CCSS-Negative 
Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
January 2011 NH, SD 2 2 50 0.040 
February 2011 OK, OR, SC, WA 4 6 48 0.083 
March 2011 MN 1 7 44 0.023 
April 2011  0 7 43 0.000 
May 2011 AL 1 8 43 0.023 
June 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
July 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
August 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
September 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
October 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
November 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
December 2011  0 8 42 0.000 
January 2012 GA, IN, WY 3 11 42 0.071 
February 2012 AK, MO, UT 3 14 39 0.077 
March 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
April 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
May 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
June 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
July 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
August 2012  0 14 36 0.000 
September 2012 MI 1 15 36 0.028 
October 2012  0 15 35 0.000 
November 2012 IL 1 16 35 0.029 
December 2012  0 16 34 0.000 
January 2013 AZ, FL, TX 3 19 34 0.088 
February 2013 KS 1 20 31 0.032 
March 2013  0 20 30 0.000 
April 2013 NC 1 21 30 0.033 
May 2013 LA, NY, PA 3 24 29 0.100 
June 2013 NJ 1 25 26 0.037 
July 2013 OH 1 26 25 0.038 
August 2013  0 26 24 0.000 
September 2013  0 26 24 0.000 
October 2013  0 26 24 0.000 
November 2013  0 26 24 0.000 
December 2013  0 26 24 0.000 !!!!!!!!!
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Table 3: Monthly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Positive 
Legislation 
Time Period 
States Introducing 
CCSS-Positive 
Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
January 2011 CA, HI, MN, OR, WA 5 5 50 0.100 
February 2011 AR, NV, OK 3 8 45 0.067 
March 2011 GA, ME, NC 3 11 42 0.071 
April 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
May 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
June 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
July 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
August 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
September 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
October 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
November 2011  0 11 39 0.000 
December 2011 UT 1 12 39 0.026 
January 2012 
AZ, CO, DE, FL, IN, 
KY, MD, NM, TN, 
VT, WV 
11 23 38 0.289 
February 2012 CT, IA, MS, WY 4 27 27 0.148 
March 2012 AL, LA, NJ, OH 4 31 23 0.174 
April 2012 PA 1 32 19 0.053 
May 2012 MT 1 33 18 0.056 
June 2012  0 33 17 0.000 
July 2012 MA 1 34 17 0.059 
August 2012  0 34 16 0.000 
September 2012  0 34 16 0.000 
October 2012  0 34 16 0.000 
November 2012 MI 1 35 16 0.063 
December 2012  0 35 15 0.000 
January 2013 KS, NE, NY, ND, VA 5 40 15 0.334 
February 2013 IL, MO, TX 3 43 10 0.300 
March 2013 AK, ID 2 45 7 0.286 
April 2013  0 45 5 0.000 
May 2013 NH 1 46 5 0.200 
June 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
July 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
August 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
September 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
October 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
November 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
December 2013  0 46 4 0.000 
'
 These tables, and accompanying Figure 5 show that while hazard rates have not 
steadily increased each month over time, there has been a general upward trend, with 
spikes in the hazard rate generally coinciding with months state legislatures are in 
session. January 2012 was a period with a very high hazard rate relative to other months 
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studied, and January 2013 saw another large spike. The highest hazard rates observed in 
the dataset were in January 2013 for all CCSS-related legislation introductions and for 
CCSS-positive legislation introductions, and May 2013 for CCSS-negative legislation 
introductions. The last instances in my dataset of first introductions of legislation in any 
of these three cases occurred in July 2013 with CCSS-negative legislation introductions. 
Figure'5:'Hazard'Rates'from'Risk'Sets'for'First'Introductions'of'CCSS5Related'
Legislation'
'
 The dramatic recent increase in hazard rates over time is further illustrated in 
Tables 4-6, which show the hazard rate calculated for each year included in the dataset 
for all CCSS-related legislation, for CCSS-negative legislation, and for CCSS-positive 
legislation. In each case, hazard rates have steadily increased over the three years 
covered, with a sharp increase between 2012 and 2013 for CCSS-negative legislation and 
between 2011 and 2012 for all CCSS-related legislation and for CCSS-positive 
legislation. Between 2011 and 2012, the hazard rate for first introductions of CCSS-
negative legislation increased by about 18.75%, while the hazard rate from 2012 to 2013 
0!0.1!
0.2!0.3!
0.4!0.5!
0.6!0.7!
0.8!
All!CCSS1Related! CCSS1Positive! CCSS1Negative!
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increased by 54.74%. This shows that the probability of the introduction of CCSS-
negative legislation in a state legislature has increased dramatically in just the last year. 
Table 4: Yearly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Related 
Legislation 
Time Period States Introducing CCSS-Related Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
2011 
CA, HI, MN, NH, OR, SD, 
WA, AR, NV, OK, SC, GA, 
ME, NC, AL, UT 
16 16 50 0.320 
2012 
AZ, CO, DE, FL, IN, KY, 
MD, NM, TN, VT, WV, 
WY, AK, CT, IA, MS, MO, 
LA, NJ, OH, PA, MT, MA, 
MI, IL 
25 41 34 0.735 
2013 KS, NE, NY, ND, TX, VA, ID 7 48 9 0.778 
'
Table 5: Yearly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Negative 
Legislation 
Time Period States Introducing CCSS-Negative Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
2011 NH, SD, OK, OR, SC, WA, MN, AL 8 8 50 0.160 
2012 GA, IN, WY, AK, MO, UT, MI, IL 8 16 42 0.190 
2013 AZ, FL, TX, KS, NC, LA, NY, PA, NJ, OH 10 26 34 0.294 
 
Table 6: Yearly Risk Sets, Hazard Rates, and States Introducing CCSS-Positive 
Legislation 
Time Period States Introducing CCSS-Negative Legislation 
Number of 
Introductions 
Cumulative 
Introductions 
Risk 
Set 
Hazard 
Rate 
2011 AR, CA, GA, HI, ME, MN, NV, NC, OK, OR, UT, WA 12 12 50 0.240 
2012 
AL, AZ, CO, CT, DE, FL, 
IN, IA, KY, LA, MD, MA, 
MI, MS, MT, NJ, NM, OH, 
PA, TN, VT, WV, WY 
23 35 38 0.605 
2013 AK, ID, IL, KS, MO, NE, NY, ND, TX, VA 10 45 15 0.667 
 
 
 The diffusion of introduction of CCSS-negative legislation across states is 
illustrated in Table 7, which shows the calculation of average proportion of adjacent 
adopters (APAA) over the time period in which diffusion occurred.!The APAA for each 
period of diffusion was calculated by ranking all states by their order of introduction of 
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CCSS-negative legislation, calculating the proportion of neighboring states that had 
previously seen the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation, then calculating the 
running average of these proportions over time by dividing the cumulative proportion of 
introductions by the number of previous introductions. This calculation comes from the 
method introduced by Mooney (2001) in his attempt to empirically assess the regional 
effect on a single policy’s diffusion.  
Table 7: Average Proportions of Adjacent Adopters (APAA) for CCSS-Negative 
Legislation Introductions 
State Time Period 
Extent of 
Diffusion 
Adjacent 
Adopters 
(Introductions) 
Proportion of 
Adopters 
(Introductions) 
APAA 
New Hampshire (NH) 1 1 0 0.00 0.0000 
South Dakota (SD) 1 1 0 0.00 0.0000 
Oklahoma (OK) 2 3 0 0.00 0.0000 
Oregon (OR) 2 3 0 0.00 0.0000 
South Carolina (SC) 2 3 0 0.00 0.0000 
Washington (WA) 2 3 0 0.00 0.0000 
Minnesota (MN) 3 7 1 0.20 0.0333 
Alabama (AL) 5 8 0 0.00 0.0286 
Georgia (GA) 13 9 2 0.40 0.0750 
Indiana (IN) 13 9 0 0.00 0.0250 
Wyoming (WY) 13 9 1 0.17 0.0458 
Alaska (AK) 14 12 0 0.00 0.0697 
Missouri (MO) 14 12 1 0.13 0.0811 
Utah (UT) 14 12 1 0.17 0.0848 
Michigan (MI) 21 15 1 0.25 0.0935 
Illinois (IL) 23 16 3 0.50 0.1206 
Arizona (AZ) 25 17 1 0.20 0.1255 
Florida (FL) 25 17 2 1.00 0.1755 
Texas (TX) 25 17 1 0.25 0.1286 
Kansas (KS) 26 20 2 0.50 0.1978 
North Carolina (NC) 28 21 2 0.50 0.2129 
Louisiana (LA) 29 22 1 0.33 0.2187 
New York (NY) 29 22 0 0.00 0.2028 
Pennsylvania (PA) 29 22 0 0.00 0.2028 
New Jersey (NJ) 30 25 2 0.50 0.2037 
Ohio (OH) 31 26 3 0.60 0.2189 
 !
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 This table illustrates the running average of neighboring states that had previously 
seen introductions of CCSS-negative legislation.!Proportion of neighboring states was 
calculated here and in other variables based on Berry & Berry’s (1990) list of state 
neighbors. In this list, states are assumed to be neighbors of all states that share a border 
and the pairs of New Jersey and Maryland and Massachusetts and Maine are treated as 
neighbors. By calculating these values, it is possible to see where regional effects may 
have had an impact on the diffusion of CCSS-negative legislation introduction.  
Figure 6: Average Proportions of Adjacent Adopters (APAA) for CCSS-Negative 
Legislation Introductions 
 
 Results of the APAA calculation are consolidated and shown in Figure 6 along 
with an estimated “constant effect” that shows an approximation of what APAA would 
look like if regional effects were not a factor in CCSS-negative legislation introduction 
This constant effect was informed by Mooney’s (2001) simulated regional effect APAA 
calculations. The signal of regional diffusion effects to look for in this figure is when the 
calculated APAA trend line goes above the estimated constant effect trend line. When 
comparing the two lines on Figure 6, it appears that regional diffusion effects did, in fact, 
cross the constant effects line after the extent of diffusion reached 21 states, which 
0!0.05!
0.1!0.15!
0.2!0.25!
0.3!
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occurred in April 2013. Although the calculated APAA trend line falls below the constant 
effects line for most of the time period covered, the lines are very close together, 
suggesting a continuation of some level of regional influence. The noticeable jump in the 
calculated APAA scores beginning in January 2013 (when the extent of diffusion had 
reached 17 states) suggests that, consistent with the sharp increase in hazard rates in 2013 
for first introductions of CCSS-negative legislation, regional diffusion effects for first 
introductions of these pieces of legislation became significant beginning in 2013.!!
 In order to more clearly visualize the effects of my variables on the introduction 
of CCSS-negative legislation, I created several maps to make visual comparisons of 
variables easier on a state-by-state basis and to show the spread across states over time of 
introduction of these policies. 
 Before diving into deep analysis of the data, I created three visualizations to show 
the basic frequency of overall CCSS-related legislation and of CCSS-negative legislation.   
First, Figure 7 shows the cumulative number of all CCSS-related pieces of legislation 
introduced in each state. This map shows how heavily each state legislature focused on 
CCSS-related legislation over the time period covered by my dataset. Lighter-colored 
states are those with fewer overall introductions of CCSS-related legislation and darker-
colored states are those with more introductions of CCSS-related pieces of legislation. 
Second, Figure 8 shows the cumulative number of pieces of CCSS-negative legislation 
introduced in each state. Similar to Figure 7, lighter-colored states are those with fewer 
introductions of CCSS-negative legislation and darker-colored states are those with more 
introductions of CCSS-negative legislation. States with no introductions of CCSS-
negative legislation are left blank. To further illustrate the variation across states of the 
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general support (or lack of support) shown by state legislatures for the CCSS, Figure 9 
shows the percent of all CCSS-related legislation introduced that was CCSS-negative. 
Lighter-colored states had a lower percentage of CCSS-negative legislation introduced 
and darker-colored states had higher percentages of CCSS-negative legislation 
introduced. 
  
Figure 7: Total Number of CCSS-Related Bill Introductions (2011-2013) !
!!
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Figure 8: Total Number of CCSS-Negative Bill Introductions (2011-2013) !
!!
Figure 9: CCSS-Negative Bill Introductions as Percent of All CCSS-Related Bill 
Introductions (2011-2013) !
!
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Figure 10: Year of First CCSS-Negative Bill Introduction (2011-2013)!!
!!
 
 Figure 10 shows an illustration of the main dependent variable used in my 
analysis. This map shows the year of the first introduction of CCSS-negative legislation 
in each state. States that did not see the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation in the 
time period studied are left blank, the states with the earliest introductions of CCSS-
negative legislation are light colors, and the states with the latest introductions of CCSS-
negative legislation are the darkest colors. From looking at this map, it is clear that the 
majority of the early introductions of CCSS-negative legislation happened in the 
northwest and central United States, while later adoptions are concentrated in the 
northeast region of the country. The rough clustering of states and their times of first 
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introduction of CCSS-negative legislation provides support for the idea of regional 
effects at play in the diffusion of introduction of this legislation. 
 
Study Hypotheses 
 To further explore the motivations behind introductions of CCSS-related bills, I 
tested seven hypotheses related to factors that could contribute to CCSS-negative bill 
introductions. These hypotheses address both internal factors in states and external 
diffusion effects that could impact the likelihood of CCSS-related legislation 
introductions in a given state legislature. 
Hypothesis 1: States with higher levels of educational attainment will be more likely to 
see CCSS-negative legislation introduced in their state. 
 Educational attainment is an internal measure of the “innovativeness” of a state 
that could impact the policies adopted and the legislation introduced. In general, variation 
in levels of socioeconomic development is associated with variation in state policies 
(Walker, 1969; Dawson & Robinson, 1963). McLendon et al. (2006) extend this 
relationship between socioeconomic development and policy variation to explore the 
specific effects of educational attainment as a measure of a state’s socioeconomic 
development. Here, I hypothesize that states with higher levels of educational attainment 
already have relatively high-quality policies regarding education and thus legislators will 
not feel that keeping the CCSS is necessary for their continued good performance in 
education. 
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Hypothesis 2: States where elected officials were responsible for adopting the Common 
Core will be less likely to see CCSS-negative legislation introduced in their state 
legislatures. 
 This hypothesis is based on the idea that policies created or adopted by elected 
officials will have more popular support. Theoretically, elected officials represent the 
people who elected them. This means that if the political system is efficient, everyone’s 
preferences will be represented in the creation or adoption of new policies. Here, I 
hypothesize that in cases where the decision to adopt the Common Core State Standards 
was made by elected officials in a state, there will be fewer introductions of CCSS-
negative legislation in that state’s legislature.  
Hypothesis 3: States where there are active PIE Network member organizations will be 
less likely to see CCSS-negative legislation introduced in their state legislatures. 
 The PIE (Policy Innovators in Education) Network is a group of 45 education 
reform organizations spread across 28 states that serves to connect these organizations to 
policy partners and advocacy partners in their states. PIE Network member organizations 
share a set of common commitments and objectives, one of which is to “Advance 
college-and career-ready standards across the curriculum that are at least as rigorous as 
the Common Core State Standards.”3 Because PIE Network member organizations are 
committed to rigorous standards, and because their specific objectives mention the 
Common Core State Standards by name, I expect the presence of these organizations in a 
given state to decrease the likelihood that CCSS-negative legislation will be introduced in 
that state. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 A full list of PIE Network commitments can be found here: http://pie-
network.org/why/network-commitments  
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Hypothesis 4: States with a Republican-controlled legislature will be more likely to see 
the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation. 
 This hypothesis is based on the idea that a unified legislature will be better able to 
avoid the obstacles to innovation that are faced by non-unified legislatures. Furthermore, 
Republican-controlled legislatures should be more likely to see the introduction of CCSS-
negative legislation because many conservative groups have expressed negative opinions 
of the CCSS4 and the Republican National Committee has passed a resolution 
denouncing the Common Core.5 This combination of partisanship and unified control 
should theoretically lead to a higher probability of the introduction of CCSS-negative 
legislation. 
Hypothesis 5: States with a Republican governor will be more likely to see the 
introduction of CCSS-negative legislation. 
 This hypothesis is similar to Hypothesis 4 in that it is focused on party control of 
each state. Considering the party identification of the state governor is a more indirect 
consideration of the obstacles to innovation, as the governor has veto power but cannot 
specifically block the introduction of legislation upfront with more than a veto threat. 
Hypothesis 6: States with higher proportions of more innovative neighbors (and thus 
lower Race to the Top scores) will be more likely to see the introduction of CCSS-
negative legislation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For example the conservative group American Principles Project has established an 
anti-Common Core website (http://www.fightcommoncore.com) to “provide information 
about the dangers of centralizing education through the Common Core State Standards 
and the work that is being done at the state and federal levels to repeal it.” 
5 Full text of the RNC resolution can be found here: 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B558bfJRCLuuOXdsVXJmZy1IRms 
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 This hypothesis is based on both internal and external determinants. Here I 
hypothesize that state that has a high proportion of more innovative neighbors (as 
measured by state RTTT scores), and thus a lower RTTT score, will be more likely to see 
the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation. There are two reasons behind this 
hypothesis. First, it is entirely possible that a state may have adopted the CCSS just to 
check off a box on their RTTT application and, after receiving a low score, started to 
move away from the CCSS. Similarly, a second reason could be that states seeing their 
adjacent neighbors receive higher RTTT scores may move away from the CCSS in an 
attempt to innovate away from the restrictions placed on states by the RTTT application 
criteria.  
Hypothesis 7: States with higher proportions of adjacent neighbors who have previously 
seen the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation will be more likely to see CCSS-
negative legislation introduced in their state legislatures. 
 This hypothesis is based on the relationship between geography and state policy 
diffusion that has been explored by many researchers (Berry & Berry, 1990; Mintrom, 
1997). According to these studies, one of the most prevalent diffusion models that exists 
is that in which states are most likely to look to their immediate neighbors for policy 
innovations. In the Berry & Berry’s classic 1990 study of state lottery adoptions, they 
found that a state’s probability of adopting a lottery was positively related to the number 
of bordering states that had previously adopted a lottery. I use this same basic idea in this 
hypothesis and assume that a state’s likelihood of seeing an introduction of CCSS-
negative legislation is positively related to the number of bordering states in which 
CCSS-negative legislation had been introduced in an earlier time period.  
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Data and Methods 
Variables and Measures 
 The dataset used in this analysis includes data for all 50 states; however, Alaska 
and Hawaii were dropped from the regression analysis, consistent with similar state 
policy diffusion studies (Berry & Berry, 1990). These were excluded from regression 
analysis because their distance from the contiguous 48 states made assessment of 
diffusion effects impossible, leading to missing data for variables calculated based on 
neighboring state effects. Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia were also included in the dataset 
because, though they had not adopted the Common Core State Standards during the time 
period of my study, their state legislatures still saw introductions of CCSS-related bills.  
 The dependent variables being analyzed are introductions of CCSS-related 
legislation in a state legislature. My analysis uses both counts of CCSS-related bills 
introduced and binary measures of whether or not a CCSS-related bill was introduced in a 
given time period, and uses these variables to study both CCSS-negative bills and CCSS-
positive bills in addition to all CCSS-related bills. My hypotheses are largely focused on 
introductions of CCSS-negative legislation, so the measures of CCSS-positive legislation 
introductions and overall CCSS-related legislation introductions serve mostly as points of 
comparison against the CCSS-negative models. This data was collected from a dataset 
maintained by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) that tracks state 
legislation addressing college- and career-readiness state standards, including the 
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Common Core State Standards.6 This data was cross-checked against and supplemented 
by data from Open States, a website maintained by the Sunlight Foundation that 
aggregates information about all bills introduced in state legislatures.7   
 The legislation tracked in the NCSL dataset is categorized by legislative 
objective.8 Each bill was labeled with at least one legislative objective. For the purposes 
of my analysis, I define “CCSS-negative” legislation as bills labeled as “Legislative 
Disapprobation Legislation” or “Revocation Legislation.” Legislative disapprobation bills 
are those that express formal legislative disapproval of the CCSS but stop short of 
requiring revocation of the CCSS and revocation bills are those that require the state to 
revoke previous adoption of the CCSS. These two categories of legislative objective are 
grouped together for the purposes of this analysis because these were the two “negative” 
categories available and combining them created a more complete view of states’ 
movement away from the CCSS.  The total number of observations of introduction of 
CCSS-negative legislation in states was 57 bills in 26 states in the years 2011 to 2013.   
 I define “CCSS-positive” as all bills that are not labeled as “Legislative 
Disapprobation Legislation” or “Revocation Legislation.” Although in reality these bills 
range from neutral to positive on Common Core issues, I chose to group them all together 
under the “CCSS-positive” label for two reasons. First, I wanted to create a simple !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!This data and information about the specific legislative objectives covered by the 
included legislation was retrieved from the NCSL College- and Career-State Sate 
Standards State Legislative Update: http://www.ccsslegislation.info   
7 Data from Open States can be viewed here: http://openstates.org/  8!The legislative objective labels in this dataset are: Appropriation Legislation; 
Assessment Legislation, Creation of Task Force, Formal Evaluation, Review, or Study; 
College- and Career- Readiness Legislation; Curriculum (Instructional Materials) 
Legislation; Educator-Related Legislation; High School Graduation Requirements 
Legislation; Higher Education Legislation; Legislative Disapprobation Legislation; Other 
Misc. Legislation; and Revocation Legislation. !
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comparison for CCSS-negative bills against all other bills, and second, I wanted to 
simplify my analysis and avoid incorrectly classifying bills into one of many groups. The 
total number of observations of introduction of CCSS-positive legislation in states was 
348 bills in 48 states in the years 2011 to 2013. 
 Two independent variables were included in the dataset to account for the 
political environment of each state and state legislature. Republican Governor is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a Republican held the governor’s office in a state in a 
given month. Republican Legislature is a dummy variable indicating whether the state 
legislature was under Republican control in a state in a given month. Data for both of 
these variables was collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures and 
from state government websites. 
 RTTT Score and % Innovative Neighbors are independent variables included in 
the analysis to account for the performance of each state in the Race to the Top grant 
competition and the relative innovativeness of each state as compared to its neighbors. 
Data for the Race to the Top scores was collected from the Department of Education. The 
most recent score received by each state was used in this dataset to allow for analysis of 
only the most up-to-date measure of innovativeness. Because both Round 1 and Round 2 
scores were released in 2010 (before the time period covered by my analysis), most 
scores used in this variable are the more recent Round 2 scores. If states did not submit 
Round 2 applications, the Round 1 score was used. The % Innovative Neighbors variable 
was calculated for each state by finding the percent of neighboring states that received a 
higher Race to the Top score. 
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 One independent variable was included in the dataset as a measure of educational 
attainment. H.S. Educational Attainment measures the percentage of a state’s population 
age 25 and higher that has completed high school. Data for this variable was collected 
from the United States Census Bureau. Due to limitations of the data available for state-
level measures, 2009 values (collected based on data from the 2010 Census) for 
educational attainment are used for each state. 
 Three variables were created to measure percentages of state neighbors with 
CCSS-related legislation introduced in previous time periods. The All Previous Adjacent 
Adopters independent variable measures the percentage of a state’s neighbors that had 
any CCSS-related legislation introduced in their state’s legislature in an earlier time 
period, the Negative Previous Adjacent Adopters independent variable measures the 
percentage of a state’s neighbors that had already seen the introduction of CCSS-negative 
legislation in their state legislature in an earlier time period, and the Positive Previous 
Adjacent Adopters independent variable measures the percentage of a state’s neighbors 
that had already seen the introduction of CCSS-positive legislation in their state 
legislature in an earlier time period. These variables were constructed based on the dates 
of introduction of all CCSS-related legislation and of CCSS-negative and CCSS-positive 
legislation in each individual state and its adjacent neighbors. 
 PIE Network Number is an independent variable counting the number of PIE 
Network organizations that exist in each state. This variable was constructed as a count 
rather than a binary variable because I assume that the number of PIE Network 
organizations in each state affects the overall influence and visibility of the PIE 
Network’s commitments and objectives relating to the Common Core State Standards. 
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Information about the member organizations in each state was collected from the PIE 
Network website.9 
 The Elected Adopter independent variable was constructed to capture whether the 
party in each state responsible for adopting the Common Core State Standards was 
elected by a popular vote or was composed of appointed officials or career bureaucrats. 
In most states, either the state Department of Education (or equivalent) or the state Board 
of Education (or equivalent) was responsible for making the decision to adopt the 
Common Core. Using data provided by the Common Core State Standards website10, I 
collected information about the adopting body in each state. If the adopting body was 
comprised of at least 50% elected officials, I considered the state to have an “Elected 
Adopter” of the Common Core. 
 An independent variable indicating whether or not the state legislature was in 
session was also included in the analysis. Although it is possible that bills could be 
introduced in a state while the legislature is not in session, the vast majority of bills will 
be introduced during in-session times. The introduction of any legislation in a state is 
heavily dependent upon whether or not the legislature is in session, so controlling for this 
variation in legislative activity within each year was important. 
Research Methods 
 I use nine models (three sets of three models) in my analysis of CCSS-related bill 
introductions. First, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the count of 
CCSS-related bill introductions in each time period for all CCSS-related bills, all CCSS-
negative bills, and all CCSS-positive bills. Second, I use logit models to examine binary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 http://www.pie-network.org/who/network-members  
10 http://www.corestandards.org/  
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dependent variables for introductions of all CCSS-related bills, all CCSS-negative bills, 
and all CCSS-positive bills. Third, I use logit models to examine first introductions of all 
CCSS-related bills, CCSS-negative bills, and CCSS-positive bills in each state. For the 
purposes of this analysis, time is divided into discrete units: in this case, months in which 
each state may or may not have CCSS-negative legislation introduced in their legislature. 
 Using these approaches allows for the inclusion of both internal state 
characteristics and external factors related to neighboring states in the model, which 
allows for a more complete view of the factors pushing states toward specific policies, 
rather than just focusing on what is happening within a single state and assuming the state 
is not influenced by its surroundings. 
 The purpose of using these three sets of models was to allow for comparison of 
how certain factors affect the number of CCSS-related bills introduced in each time 
period, whether or not any CCSS-related bills were introduced in each time period, and 
when the very first CCSS-related bill is introduced in each state legislature. By using 
these three sets of three models, I am able to draw conclusions about how my 
independent variables impact the previously mentioned outcomes for all CCSS-related 
bills, for CCSS-negative bills, and for CCSS-positive bills both within each set of models 
(e.g. examining differences in all CCSS-related, CCSS-negative, and CCSS-positive bill 
introductions in the bill count models) and across sets of models (e.g. examining 
differences in CCSS-negative bill introductions across the CCSS-negative count model, 
CCSS-negative binary model, and CCSS-negative first introduction model). 
 My first two sets of models (count models and binary models) provide an overall 
view of CCSS-related bill introductions over the time period of my study. The third set of 
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models (first introductions models) provides a slightly different view of CCSS-related 
bill introductions. These models are based on Event History Analysis (EHA) models, as 
described in Berry & Berry (1990). These introductions of legislation are assumed to be 
non-repeatable events. Although these events are definitely repeatable in actuality, 
making this assumption fulfills the goals of this analysis because these models are 
intended to capture the first signs of movement toward or away from the CCSS in each 
state. This assumption further simplifies the analysis by allowing for the creation of a risk 
set and the calculation of hazard rates for each time period. The risk set includes the 
states “at risk” of introduction of CCSS-related legislation in each month. The risk set 
begins when the first state experiences the event and states are removed from the dataset 
after the period in which CCSS-related legislation is introduced in their legislature. For 
example, the CCSS-negative risk set begins when the first state experiences the event 
(New Hampshire and South Dakota in January 2011) and states are removed from the 
dataset after the period in which CCSS-negative legislation is introduced in their state 
legislature. In the latest time period covered by the dataset (December 2013), only 24 
states remain, as the observed event occurred in 26 of the 50 states over the course of the 
observed time span. See Tables 1-3 for risk set numbers by month. Separate risk sets 
were compiled for all CCSS-related legislation, for CCSS-negative legislation, and for 
CCSS-positive legislation. 
 An important consideration to make when viewing results of the analysis 
performed on the risk set data is that the EHA models in the existing literature are all 
focused on actual adoptions of policy, while these models only address the first 
introduction of a potential policy in a state legislature. Additionally, my independent 
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variables of most interest are focused on movement away from the CCSS with 
introductions of CCSS-negative legislation, while other EHA studies seek to explain the 
adoption of new policies. These are important caveats to keep in mind while viewing the 
results of my analysis. 
 
Analysis and Results 
 The statistical results of my analysis of introductions of CCSS-related legislation 
are reported numerically in Tables 8-10 and graphically in Figures 11-13. I will first 
give an overview of the results of my nine models, and then break the results down in 
more detail for each of my hypotheses.  
Models 1-3: Counts of CCSS-Related Legislation Introductions 
 My first set of three models (Table 8 and Figure 11) focuses on numbers of 
introductions of CCSS-related legislation in each state in each time period. The 
dependent variables assessed in these models are total number of CCSS-related bill 
introductions in each time period (Model 1), number of CCSS-negative bill introductions 
in each time period (Model 2), and number of CCSS-positive bill introductions in each 
time period (Model 3). 
 H.S. Educational Attainment is negative and statistically significant in all three of 
these models, meaning in each case (overall, negative, and positive), higher levels of high 
school educational attainment in a state lead to lower numbers of CCSS-related bill 
introductions. The Elected Adopter variable is statistically significant only in Model 2, 
where the coefficient is negative, so states with elected adopters of the Common Core 
State Standards will see fewer introductions of CCSS-negative bills. PIE Network 
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Number is positive and statistically significant in Model 1 and in Model 3, so higher 
numbers of PIE Network organizations in a state lead to higher overall numbers of 
CCSS-related bills and higher numbers of CCSS-positive bills in a state. Republican 
Legislature is positive and statistically significant only in Model 2, so states with a 
Republican-controlled legislature have higher numbers of introductions of CCSS-positive 
legislation. The Republican Governor and % Innovative Neighbors variables are not 
statistically significant in any of these models.  
Table 8: Bill Introduction Counts Regressions 
 Model 1 
(All Bills) 
Model 2 
(Negative Bills) 
Model 3 
(Positive Bills) 
Variable Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
HSEducAttain -0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.005+ 
(0.003) 
-0.026** 
(0.008) 
ElectedAdopter -0.065 
(0.067) 
-0.034+ 
(0.021) 
-0.040 
(0.063) 
pienetworknumber 0.078* 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.070* 
(0.033) 
legislature_repub -0.002 
(0.067) 
0.064** 
(0.021) 
-0.054 
(0.063) 
governor_party 0.002 
(0.070) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.066) 
pct_innovative_neighbors -0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
RTTTScore -0.002** 
(0.001) 
-0.000+ 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
AllPrevAdj 0.003*** 
(0.001)  
 
NegPrevAdj  0.001** (0.000) 
 
PosPrevAdj   0.002** (0.001) 
InSession 0.492*** 
(0.055) 
0.121*** 
(0.017) 
0.369*** 
(0.052) 
(Intercept) 2.918*** 
(0.863) 
0.456+ 
(0.261) 
2.595** 
(0.814) 
Number of Observations 1475 1475 1475 
Multiple R2 0.069 0.051 0.049 
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.045 0.043 
Signif. Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10  !
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RTTT Score is statistically significant and negative (but very close to zero) in each of 
these three models, which shows that Race to the Top Scores have very small, if any, 
negative impact on the number of CCSS-related bills introduced in each state. The 
Previous Adjacent Adopters variables are statistically significant and positive (but very 
close to zero) in each of these three models, showing that the percent of adjacent states 
with introductions of CCSS-related legislation (overall, negative, and positive) in 
previous time periods has a very small positive impact on the number of CCSS-related 
bills introduced in a state in a given time period. 
Figure 11: Bill Introduction Counts Regressions 
!
Green%=%CCSS)positive%bills;%Red%=%CCSS)negative%bills;%Black%=%All%CCSS)related%bills%Dots!represent!coefficients!and!lines!represent!95%!confidence!intervals.!
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Models 4-6: Binary CCSS-Related Legislation Introductions 
 My second set of three models (Table 9 and Figure 12) focuses on whether or not 
there were any introductions of CCSS-related legislation in each state in each time 
period. The dependent variables assessed in these models are whether or not any CCSS-
related bill introductions occurred in each time period (Model 4), whether or not any 
CCSS-negative bill introductions occurred in each time period (Model 5), and whether or 
not any CCSS-positive bill introductions occurred in each time period (Model 6). 
 H.S. Educational Attainment is negative and statistically significant in Model 4 
and Model 6, meaning that for all CCSS-related bills and for specifically CCSS-positive 
bills, higher levels of high school educational attainment in a state lead to lower 
probabilities of these bill introductions occurring. The Elected Adopter variable is 
statistically significant only in Model 5, where the coefficient is negative, so states with 
elected adopters of the Common Core State Standards will be less likely to see 
introductions of CCSS-negative bills. The PIE Network Number variable is not 
statistically significant in any of these models. Republican Legislature is statistically 
significant in both Model 5 and Model 6, and the relationship is opposite for CCSS-
negative bills and CCSS-positive bills. States with Republican-controlled legislatures will 
be more likely to see introductions of CCSS-negative legislation in any given time 
period, and states with Republican-controlled legislatures will be less likely to see 
introductions of CCSS-positive legislation in a given time period. The Republican 
Governor and % Innovative Neighbors variables are not statistically significant in any of 
these models. RTTT Score is statistically significant and negative (but very close to zero) 
in each of these three models, which shows that Race to the Top Scores have very small, 
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if any, negative impact on the likelihood of CCSS-related bill introductions in each state. 
The Previous Adjacent Adopters variables are statistically significant and positive (but 
very close to zero) in each of these three models, showing that the percent of adjacent 
states with introductions of CCSS-related legislation (overall, negative, and positive) in 
previous time periods has a very small positive impact on the likelihood of CCSS-related 
bill introductions in a state in a given time period. 
Table 9: Bill Introduction Logistic Regressions 
 Model 4 
(All Bills) 
Model 5 
(Negative Bills) 
Model 6 
(Positive Bills) 
Variable Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
HSEducAttain -0.057+ 
(0.032) 
-0.051 
(0.057) 
-0.061+ 
(0.035) 
ElectedAdopter -0.036 
(0.247) 
-0.809* 
(0.391) 
0.014 
(0.273) 
pienetworknumber 0.033 
(0.128) 
0.318 
(0.251) 
0.043 
(0.139) 
legislature_repub -0.231 
(0.247) 
1.349** 
(0.502) 
-0.555* 
(0.277) 
governor_party 0.155 
(0.264) 
0.300 
(0.469) 
0.235 
(0.293) 
pct_innovative_neighbors -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
RTTTScore -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
AllPrevAdj 0.011*** 
(0.003)  
 
NegPrevAdj  0.015* (0.006) 
 
PosPrevAdj   0.007* (0.003) 
InSession 3.626*** 
(0.401) 
4.422*** 
(1.021) 
3.141*** 
(0.402) 
(Intercept) 1.444 
(3.053) 
-1.698 
(5.407) 
2.188 
(3.300) 
Number of Observations 1475 1475 1475 
AIC 787.12 345.45 696.56 
Signif. Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10  
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Figure 12: Bill Introduction Logistic Regressions !
!
Green%=%CCSS)positive%bills;%Red%=%CCSS)negative%bills;%Black%=%All%CCSS)related%bills%Dots!represent!coefficients!and!lines!represent!95%!confidence!intervals.%
 
Models 7-9: First Introductions of CCSS-Related Legislation 
 My third set of three models (Table 10 and Figure 13) focuses on the first 
introductions of CCSS-related legislation in each state. The dependent variables assessed 
in these models are the first introductions of any CCSS-related legislation in each state 
(Model 7), the first introductions of CCSS-negative legislation in each state (Model 8), 
the first introductions of CCSS-positive legislation in each state (Model 9). This section 
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of analysis was performed using risk sets for each of the dependent variables of interest, 
so state-month observations were dropped after the time period of the first introduction of 
the legislation type of interest in each state.  
 H.S. Educational Attainment is negative and statistically significant in Model 7 
and Model 9, meaning that for all CCSS-related bills and for specifically CCSS-positive 
bills, higher levels of high school educational attainment in a state lead to lower 
probabilities of these first bill introductions occurring in any given time period. The 
Elected Adopter variable is statistically significant in Model 7 and in Model 8, and in 
each case the coefficient is negative, so states with elected adopters of the Common Core 
State Standards will be less likely to see these first introductions of all CCSS-related bill 
and of CCSS-negative bills in a given time period. The PIE Network Number variable is 
not statistically significant in any of these models. Republican Legislature is statistically 
significant only in Model 8, where the coefficient is positive, so states will a Republican-
controlled legislature will be more likely to see the first introduction of CCSS-negative 
legislation in a given time period. The Republican Governor and % Innovative Neighbors 
variables are not statistically significant in any of these models. RTTT Score is 
statistically significant and negative (but very close to zero) in each of these three 
models, which shows that Race to the Top Scores have very small, if any, negative 
impact on the likelihood of first introductions of CCSS-related bills in each state in a 
given time period. The Previous Adjacent Adopters variables are statistically significant 
and positive (but very close to zero) in Model 7 and Model 9, showing that the percent of 
adjacent states with introductions of all CCSS-related legislation or CCSS-positive 
legislation in previous time periods has a very small positive impact on the likelihood of 
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the first introduction of a CCSS-related bill overall or a CCSS-positive bill in a state in 
any given time period. 
Table 10: Bill Introduction Risk Set Logistic Regressions  
 Model 7 
(All Bills) 
Model 8 
(Negative Bills) 
Model 9 
(Positive Bills) 
Variable Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
Coef. 
(SE) 
HSEducAttain -0.131+ 
(0.071) 
0.006 
(0.089) 
-0.160* 
(0.071) 
ElectedAdopter -1.240* 
(0.578) 
-1.328* 
(0.628) 
-0.288 
(0.519) 
pienetworknumber 0.084 
(0.345) 
0.180 
(0.435) 
0.150 
(0.354) 
legislature_repub 0.450 
(0.532) 
1.654* 
(0.660) 
-0.413 
(0.562) 
governor_party -0.123 
(0.532) 
0.527 
(0.655) 
0.250 
(0.565) 
pct_innovative_neighbors -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
RTTTScore -0.014** 
(0.004) 
-0.008+ 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.003) 
AllPrevAdj 0.012* 
(0.006)  
 
NegPrevAdj  0.005 (0.009) 
 
PosPrevAdj   0.011* (0.005) 
InSession 3.142*** 
(0.779) 
3.203** 
(1.053) 
2.837*** 
(0.751) 
(Intercept) 11.841+ 
(6.551) 
-5.017 
(8.086) 
11.928+ 
(6.814) 
Number of Observations 500 1033 620 
AIC 238.99 186.67 250.97 
Signif. Codes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10  !
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Figure 13: Bill Introduction Risk Set Logistic Regressions  
!
Green%=%CCSS)positive%bills;%Red%=%CCSS)negative%bills;%Black%=%All%CCSS)related%bills%Dots!represent!coefficients!and!lines!represent!95%!confidence!intervals.%
 
Analysis by Hypothesis 
 According to the results of this analysis, Hypothesis 1 (H.S. Educational 
Attainment) is generally supported. In each of the models focused on all CCSS-related 
legislation (Models 1, 4, and 7) and in each of the models focused on CCSS-positive 
legislation (Models 3, 6, and 9), results are negative and statistically significant. For 
CCSS-negative legislation, however, results are only statistically significant in Model 2, 
the analysis of numbers of CCSS-negative bills introduced in each state in each time 
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period. Although this result is statistically significant, it is in reality so close to zero that 
we can say educational attainment in a state has very little impact on the number of 
CCSS-negative bills introduced in that state’s legislature. 
 Hypothesis 2 (Elected Adopter) is supported by all three of my CCSS-negative 
models (Model 2, 5 and 8). Results regarding this independent variable are statistically 
significant and negative in all three CCSS-negative models and in one of the overall 
CCSS-related legislation models. In the case of numbers of CCSS-negative bills 
introduced in a state in a given month, states with elected adopters of the Common Core 
State Standards will have on average 0.034 fewer CCSS-negative bills introduced in a 
given month than will states with unelected adopters of the Common Core.  
 The PIE Network Number variable, which is the focus of Hypothesis 3, does not 
directly provide support for this hypothesis but provides interesting insight about the 
impact of PIE Network organizations nonetheless. Results for this variable are positive 
and statistically significant in the models for both number of all CCSS-related bills 
introduced and number of CCSS-positive bills introduced in each state in each time 
period. This shows that although we cannot make a substantive claim about the impact of 
PIE Network member organizations on introductions of CCSS-negative legislation in 
state legislatures, it is clear that more PIE Network organizations in a state leads to more 
CCSS-positive legislation introductions and more CCSS-related legislation introductions 
overall. 
 Hypothesis 4 (Republican Legislature) is strongly supported by my analysis. The 
results for this variable are positive and statistically significant in all models focusing on 
CCSS-negative bill introductions (Models 2, 5, and 8). Additionally, in each of these 
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models, the coefficient for the Republican Legislature variable is larger than for any other 
variable, excluding time controls. These results show introductions of CCSS-negative 
legislation are greater in number and are more likely to occur in states with Republican-
controlled legislatures. . In the case of numbers of CCSS-negative bills introduced in a 
state in a given month, states with Republican-controlled legislatures will have on 
average 0.064 more CCSS-negative bills introduced in a given month than will states 
with legislatures not controlled by a Republican majority.  
 Hypotheses 5 (Republican Governor) and 6 (% Innovative Neighbors) are both 
not supported by the results of my analysis. The variables used to study these hypotheses 
did not produce statistically significant results in any of the nine models. An alternative 
assessment of Hypothesis 6 could be performed through RTTT Scores, but the 
coefficients produced in each model for this variable are all so close to zero that it 
appears that Race to the Top Scores have very little impact on introductions of CCSS-
related legislation. 
 Hypothesis 7 (Previous Adjacent Adopters) is generally supported by my analysis. 
Results for this variable are positive and statistically significant in all models except 
Model 8. This means that states with more neighboring states with previous introductions 
of CCSS-related legislation will be more likely to see introductions of CCSS-related 
legislation and will see higher numbers of these introductions overall. Although these 
results are positive and statistically significant in eight of the nine models, the values 
again land very close to zero, so not much of a substantive effect can be described.  
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Conclusion and Implications 
 There are many factors in state policy-making that impact the policies that are 
introduced and adopted. In the case of states’ movement away from the Common Core 
State Standards, it appears that the most important factors to explain the introduction of 
CCSS-negative legislation are the existence of a Republican-controlled state legislature 
and states with elected adopters of the Common Core State Standards. State levels of 
educational attainment as measured by percentage of high school graduates are also 
significant (Tables 8-10). 
 Overall, the likelihood of a state seeing the introduction of CCSS-negative 
legislation has increased over time. This is shown by the overall increase in state-level 
legislative attention to the CCSS (Figure 1), the monthly hazard rate calculation (Tables 
1-3 and Figure 5), and the yearly hazard rate calculation (Tables 4-6), which shows a 
54.74% increase in the observed yearly hazard rate for introductions of CCSS-negative 
legislation between 2012 and 2013 in Table 5. 
 When looking at first introductions of CCSS-negative legislations in each state 
across time, the data also point to evidence of regional effects, as shown by the 
calculation of average proportion of adjacent adopters (Table 7 and Figure 6). This 
relationship is further demonstrated through the map of period of first introduction of 
CCSS-negative legislation in each state provided in Figure 10.  
 Several considerations must be made, however, when viewing the results of my 
analysis. First and foremost, the primary dependent variable analyzed in this study 
represents introductions of pieces of legislation and thus cannot lead to drawing any 
conclusions about the actual adoption of policies across states. Furthermore, the methods 
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used in my analysis have historically been used to examine actual adoptions of policies, 
making them not entirely applicable to my analysis. Future research could improve upon 
this by examining the adoption of CCSS-negative policies once a significant number of 
these policies have actually been adopted. Another area for future research would be to 
take this analysis a step further and study actual revocations of the CCSS across states 
after a few years when data for this exists. While my preliminary analysis of introduction 
of CCSS-negative legislation suggests some evidence of regional diffusion effects, data 
for actual policy adoptions may tell a different story. 
 Additionally, my analysis is focused movement toward the removal of an existing 
policy rather than the adoption of a brand new policy. In order for this analysis to fit the 
framework generally used in state policy diffusion literature, this movement toward 
removal of an existing policy would have to be viewed as the adoption of a revocation 
policy, which is somewhat counterintuitive. 
 Many opportunities exist for extension of this analysis outside of just waiting for 
data on policy adoptions to be available. There are many factors that exist currently that 
could influence a state’s likelihood of having CCSS-negative legislation introduced that I 
did not consider, either due to availability of data or to the limited scope of my analysis. 
For example, I did not consider the existence of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) waivers 
in my analysis, and states may be motivated to either move away from or keep the CCSS 
depending on the content of their waivers. Another potential explanatory variable that I 
did not include in my analysis was the administrative capacity of each state in regards to 
education standards and assessments. Because the CCSS provides a pre-packaged set of 
standards and will soon have accompanying assessments, one could hypothesize that state 
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administrative capacity could influence a state’s decision to either keep or revoke the 
CCSS because a state may or may not have the capacity to create sufficient standards and 
assessments on their own. 
 Despite the shortcomings of the data available and the relatively short time period 
of analysis, this study does provide sufficient evidence to say at the very least that a 
relationship does exist between the existence of a Republican-controlled state legislature 
and the introduction of CCSS-negative legislation and that a relationship does exist 
between introductions of CCSS-negative bills and whether or not the Common Core State 
Standards were adopted by an elected official. Small relationships also exist between 
CCSS-related bill introductions and the percent of previous adjacent adopting states and 
between CCSS-related bill introductions and states’ Race to the Top scores. Whether this 
holds true in the future for adopted policies rather than just introduction of legislation 
remains to be seen. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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